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EU-ASEAN Trade and Investment Relations
with a Special Focus on Singapore
Locknie Hsu
Europe’s contact with East Asia goes back further than any other region in the world. It
could be traced to Marco Polo’s historic journey to China 800 years ago. [. . .] East Asia and
the EU share a common vision for the future. They want to build a peaceful and prosperous
multipolar world. They accept globalization but also want to live in a world of cultural
diversity. East Asia and Europe want economic growth, but they also value social equity, a
healthy environment and a rich cultural life.—H.E. Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh, Europe
and East Asia Need to Get Acquainted, International Herald Tribune, 14 April 20001
Introduction
The European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) are two dynamic trade and investment blocs, each of which has been
working toward regional integration. The long and rich EU integration process has
been an interesting model and naturally, many, including ASEAN, study the EU
system for lessons to be drawn.2 Both regions aim for peace and economic
development and consist of diverse economic and social memberships.
L. Hsu (*)
Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University, 60 Stamford Road, Level 4,
Singapore 178900, Singapore
e-mail: lockniehsu@smu.edu.sg
1 Republished in Lay Hwee and Latif (2000), pp. 107–109. Among his many other honorable titles,
Amb. Koh is currently Ambassador-At-Large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, and
was also Ambassador to the US (1984–1990), founding Executive Director of the Asia-Europe
Foundation, and Singapore’s Chief Negotiator for the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
(2000–2003).
2 It is beyond the scope of this article to chronicle the long history and extensive integration
initiatives of the EU which have been examined in a great deal of academic literature; see for
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ASEAN was formed in 1967 by five founding States, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, with a view to promoting regional peace and
stability.3 The economic integration impetus began about two decades afterward,
beginning with plans for an ASEAN Free Trade Area to promote trade and
investment liberalisation, including the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers
to intra-ASEAN trade.4 The formal treaty process to realise these objectives took
place in 1992 with the introduction of a Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) system for the then members.5 Plans for an ASEAN Investment Area
were established in 1998.6 In 2009, ASEAN members signed a landmark ASEAN
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA).7 In 2008, aiming to strengthen the
legal architecture of the Association, ASEAN members adopted the ASEAN Char-
ter, setting out the Association’s purpose, objectives, the legal framework of its
institutions, and provisions for dispute settlement.8
ASEAN integration has proceeded in developing three pillars, giving rise to the
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
(ASCC) and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).9 In recent years,
ASEAN has accelerated economic integration to establish the ASEAN Economic
example, Jones et al. (2012); Dedman (2010); Dosenrode (2012). For a quick overview, see http://
europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm. For information on the EU’s global policy, see
generally: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146941.pdf.
3 The founding document is the ASEAN Declaration, also known as the Bangkok Declaration,
signed 8 August 1967, available at: http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bang
kok-declaration.
4 See Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, signed on 28 January
1992, and Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, signed on 7 October 1998;
texts of these and other related agreements and protocols are available at: http://www.asean.org/
communities/asean-economic-community/category/asean-trade-in-goods-agreement and http://
www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/category/overview-14. See also gener-
ally ASEAN website at: http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/cate
gory/asean-free-trade-area-afta-council.
5 The members in 1992 were Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam subsequently joined ASEAN in 1999,
1997, 1997 and 1995, respectively.
6 Framework Agreement. See also generally the information at the Singapore Government
website, at: http://www.fta.gov.sg/afta/9basean_investment_area.pdf.
7 The text of the ACIA is available at: http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/FINAL-
SIGNED-ACIA.pdf; the treaty came into force on 29 March 2012. It superseded two earlier, more
limited, investment treaties. See generally: http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-
community/category/asean-investment-area-aia-council.
8 See Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, available at: http://www.asean.org/
asean/asean-charter/asean-charter.
9 See Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015, ASEAN, available at: http://www.asean.org/
resources/publications/asean-publications/item/roadmap-for-an-asean-community-2009-2015.
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Community (AEC) by 2015 pursuant to the ASEAN Economic Community Blue-
print, to establish ASEAN as a single market and production base.10
In tandem with these developments, members of ASEAN also engaged in bilateral
and regional trade liberalisation and integration initiatives, by way of free trade
agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment agreements (BITs). Among ASEAN
members, Singapore was an early participant in FTAs, with its first FTA being signed
with New Zealand in 2000.11 She has, over the past 15 years, pursued a “dual-track”
approach to trade negotiations at the multilateral and bilateral/regional levels.12
As the number of bilateral FTAs was growing, ASEAN members also began to
engage in FTAs with external partners, namely Australia, New Zealand, China,
India, Korea and Japan.13 Presently, ASEAN is negotiating a Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement with these six partners.14
EU-ASEAN Trade and Investment and Singapore’s Role
After the US and China, ASEAN as a whole is the EU’s third largest trade partner,
with trade in goods and services exceeding €206 billion in 2011.15 Conversely,
after China, the EU is ASEAN’s second largest trade partner. In investment, the EU
has invested an average of €9.1 billion in ASEAN over the period of 2000–2009.16
Within ASEAN, Singapore, a trade and investment hub, is the largest trading
partner of the EU in the ASEAN bloc, accounting for one-third of EU-ASEAN
trade.17 At the end of 2011, Europe and Asia were the top two sources of FDI in
Singapore. Between the end of 2001 and the end of 2011, EU FDI in Singapore
tripled from S$85b to S$252b.18 Among EU members, the top FDI investors in
Singapore were, between 2001 and 2011, the Netherlands and the United
10 The original target for the AEC was 2020; the members decided in January 2007 at the 12th
ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines, to accelerate this date to 2015. The Blueprint (2008) is
available at: www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf.
11 See Singapore Ministry of Trade & Industry website: http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_anzscep.asp?
hl¼9.
12 For information on the Singapore Government’s policy on this, see the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs website at: http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_organisation_initiatives/ftas.
html. For information on Singapore’s FTAs that are in force, see generally www.fta.gov.sg.
13 For the FTAs in force in ASEAN, see generally the Singapore Ministry of Trade & Industry
website at: http://www.fta.gov.sg/sg_fta.asp.
14 See information sheet of the Singapore Government on the RCEP, 2012, available at: http://
www.fta.gov.sg/press_release%5CFACTSHEET%20ON%20RCEP_final.pdf.
15 See European Commission (Trade), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), avail-
able at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean.
16 European Commission (Trade), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean.
17 See European Commission (2013a), p. 16.
18 Ying and Tan (2001–2011), p. 2, available at: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/publications/publica
tions_and_papers/investment/ssnsep13-pg1-9.pdf.
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Kingdom.19 On the other hand, Singapore invested 14 % of her outward FDI stock
in Europe, with the major destinations being the United Kingdom, the Netherlands
and Switzerland.20
Given that the EU is the largest investor in ASEAN,21 it has a natural interest in
ensuring a conducive trade and investment environment and appropriate legal
protection for its investors.
Efforts were initially made to negotiate a region-to-region EU-ASEAN FTA,
with seven ASEAN members but these have not led to an agreement.22 Conse-
quently, the EU re-launched negotiations with individual ASEAN members.23 The
first of these members has been Singapore. As the EU Trade Commissioner, Karel
de Gucht, said: “The launch of FTA negotiations with Singapore, for us, marks the
beginning of a deeper engagement with Asia, and in particular our relations with the
ASEAN region.”24
The EU and Investment Negotiations, Post-Lisbon Treaty
Through the Lisbon Treaty, the EU now has exclusive competence regarding its
Common Commercial Policy which includes FDI. 25 This means that the EU is able
to negotiate investment agreements with third party states. This watershed
19Ying and Tan (2001–2011), p. 3, Table 2, available at: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/publications/
publications_and_papers/investment/ssnsep13-pg1-9.pdf.
20 Ying and Tan (2001–2011), pp. 6–7, Table 8, available at: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/publica
tions/publications_and_papers/investment/ssnsep13-pg1-9.pdf.
21 European Commission (Trade), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean.
22 According to the EU’s Progress Report on the Global Policy 2006–2010, 2010, p. 8, the reasons
were as follows:
Following Member States’ authorisation to negotiate, “region-to-region”, FTA
negotiations with a group of seven (out of ten) ASEAN countries were launched in 2007.
Until March 2009, nine negotiation rounds had been held. However, progress in these
region-to-region negotiations was slow, and both sides agreed to put negotiations on hold in
March 2009. One difficulty in the region-to-region negotiations arose from significant
structural differences within ASEAN, which meant that existing levels of liberalisation
and negotiation objectives differed widely among countries in the group.
23 EU’s Progress Report on the Global Policy 2006–2010, 2010, p. 23.
24 EU Trade Commissioner (2010).
25 See Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, [2007] OJ C 306/1, adding a new Article 2B to The Treaty
establishing the European Community—the new Art. 2B(1)(e) attributes exclusive competence
over to the Union over the common commercial policy. Article 207 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), [2012] OJ C 326/1, in turn, includes FDI matters
within the scope of the common commercial policy; and Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart,
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, p. 11. See also the Regulation (EU) No
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development has unlocked new opportunities for engagement in trade and invest-
ment matters with ASEAN/Asian States. As described in the EU document,
Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, investment
is a “new frontier” for the EU’s Common Commercial Policy.26
The EU’s Recent Negotiations in Asia: A Brief Overview
As the twentieth century came to a close, it was clear that the EU was becoming
increasingly interested in developing stronger trade and investment relations with
Asia. The European Commission’s September 2001 Communication, Europe and
Asia, a Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, laid the foundation of
renewed EU-Asian ties at the beginning of the twenty-first century.27 This was
followed not long after, by a more specific Communication, A New Partnership
with Southeast Asia, issued in 2003.28 This latter document spelt out six “strategic
priorities” for such enhanced ties, including the injection of a “new dynamism” into
regional trade and investment relations.29 This included establishment of a “trade
action plan” known as the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI).
At about roughly the same time, by way of the broader context, the US and
Singapore were negotiating a landmark FTA; the first by the US with an ASEAN
member, as part of the Asian trade and investment agenda of then President George
W. Bush.30 By 2004, Singapore had signed the United States-Singapore FTA
(USSFTA). No doubt, these developments were being watched with keen interest
by EU policy makers.
1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third
countries, [2012] OJ L 351/40, governing transitional matters on members’ BITs.
26 European Commission, Communication, Towards a Comprehensive European International
Investment Policy, COM(2010)343 final, p. 4. For an overview of EU investment policy, see
European Commission (Trade), Investment, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
accessing-markets/investment/.
27 European Commission, Communication, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for enhanced
Partnership, COM(2001)469 final.
28 European Commission, Communication, A new partnership with South East Asia, COM (2003)
399/4.
29 European Commission, Communication, A new partnership with South East Asia, COM (2003)
399/4, pp. 3–4.
30 See United States Trade Representative, The President’s 2008 Trade Policy Agenda, pp. 9–10,
available at: http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/
2008_Trade_Policy_Agenda/asset_upload_file490_14556.pdf. For a Singapore perspective, see
also Koh and Lin (2004). The US signed a US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement in 2006, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/
asset_upload_file932_9760.pdf.
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In April 2007, the EU adopted a mandate for FTA negotiations with ASEAN.
However, attempts to negotiate an FTA with ASEAN as a whole met with difficul-
ties31 and the EU subsequently decided to adopt a more limited approach with
individual countries of ASEAN.32 In 2009, the Commission was therefore further
authorised to negotiate FTAs with individual ASEAN members.33 Plans for an
EU-ASEAN FTA have been in abeyance but the EU’s position is that an
EU-ASEAN FTA remains the ultimate goal.34 With ASEAN members busy pre-
paring for the AEC deadline of 2015, it was recently reported that ASEAN will
resume negotiations with the EU after the establishment of the AEC.35
In March 2010, negotiations for an EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
(EUSFTA) were launched. The EU’s negotiating mandate was modified in 2011
to permit investment negotiations for the EUSFTA.36 By December 2013, the EU
had completed negotiations for this, its first-ever FTA with an ASEAN
country. This is also its first FTA with an Asian State that will contain an
investment chapter. Before this, the EU had completed negotiations with Canada
and Korea.37 It presently has ongoing negotiations with China,38 India,39 Japan,40
31 The signalling of the start of talks for an EU-ASEAN FTA was made in the Joint Ministerial
Statement of the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the European Union Trade Commissioner on the
Launch of the Negotiations of the ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 4 May 2007, see www.
asean.org/archive/ASEAN-EU-FTA.pdf. According to this Joint Statement, the parties intended for
the negotiating process to “be based on a region-to-region approach” and would consider “the
different levels of development and capacity of individual ASEAN Member countries”, para. 3.
32 See European Commission (Trade), Singapore, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/.
33 See European Commission, Memo, EU investment negotiations with China and ASEAN,
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-913_en.htm.
34 See European Commission (Trade) (2006).
35 See Pratruangkrai (2014).
36 European Commission, Memo, EU investment negotiations with China and ASEAN, available
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-913_en.htm.
37 Although the EU had earlier concluded a FTA with Korea, that FTA does not include an
investment chapter, as the new EU role in investment negotiations was still in gestation. The
Lisbon Treaty, discussed below, was signed on 13 December 2007, after the EU-Korea FTA
negotiations had been launched in May 2007. For the detailed timeline of the negotiations of the
FTA, see the Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at: http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/
fta/status/effect/eu/index.jsp?menu¼m_20_80_10&tabmenu¼t_2&submenu¼s_6. The
EU-Canada FTA (CETA) does, however, include an investment chapter.
38 EU-China negotiations commenced in January 2014. See European Commission (Trade), EU
and China begin investment talks, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?
id¼1013; European Commission, Memo 13/913, EU investment negotiations with China and
ASEAN, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-913_en.htm; and European
Commission (Trade) (2006).
39 Negotiations with India began in 2007 and 11 rounds have been held to date. Current meetings
appear to comprise smaller cluster groups; see European Commission (Trade) (2006).
40 Negotiations between the EU and Japan were launched in March 2013; see European Commis-
sion (Trade), Japan, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/
japan/.
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Malaysia,41 Thailand42 and Vietnam.43 Explaining part of the thinking behind these
negotiations, the EU stated recently:
. . . the EU’s global competitors are currently negotiating preferences for their own com-
panies, in the contexts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership. The EU, by negotiating preferential market access of its own, can
protect EU exporters against a loss of competitiveness in many Asian markets resulting
from the FTAs concluded by others.44
It is noteworthy too, that Singapore views the TPP and RCEP as possible
pathways to a larger Asia-Pacific free trade area.45
EU-Myanmar
Over the last two years, because of a number of domestic reforms in Myanmar,
trade and investment relations between the EU and Myanmar have thawed, and
taken on a certain momentum.
The Council of the European Union approved in July 2013 a framework of
policy for Myanmar, which envisages establishment of a “trade and investment
partnership”, including reinstatement of Myanmar’s GSP preferences and negotia-
tion of an Investment Agreement.46 In 2013, the EU repealed legislation suspending
Myanmar’s benefits under its GSP programme. Myanmar became a beneficiary of
the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA; duty-free quota-free access except for arms)
programme as of 1 January 2014.47
41 See European Commission (Trade), Malaysia, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/malaysia/.
42 Negotiations with Thailand began in 2013; see European Union, External Action, Thailand,
available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/thailand/ and European Commission (Trade), Thailand, avail-
able at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/thailand and European
Commission (Trade) (2006).
43 See European Commission (Trade), Vietnam, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/vietnam/. For an overview of the EU’s FTAs, negotiations and
launch dates, see generally European Commission, Enterprise and Industry, Free Trade Agree-
ments, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-
trade/ and European Commission (Trade) (2006).
44 Fact Sheet on the EU-Singapore FTA, European Commission, Memo 13/805, The
EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, p. 3, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
13-849_en.htm.
45 Information sheet of the Singapore Government on the RCEP, 2012, p. 3, available at: http://
www.fta.gov.sg/press_release%5CFACTSHEET%20ON%20RCEP_final.pdf.
46 See Council of the European Union (2013b), p. 4; see also Council of the European Union
(2013a).
47 See Regulation (EU) No 607/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June
2013 repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 552/97 temporarily withdrawing access to generalised
tariff preferences from Myanmar/Burma, [2013] OJ L 181/13 and European Commission (Trade)
(2014d).
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While the EU has concluded other FTAs, the focus in this article is on the
EUSFTA, and in particular, its investment obligations.
The EU-Korea FTA: The EU’s First FTA with an Asian State
The EU-Korea FTA, which entered into force in July 2011, is the first FTA that the
EU has signed with an Asian state but as its negotiations commenced before the
conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty (which confers exclusive investment negotiation
competence on the EU) it contains no investment chapter.48
CETA: The EU’s First Post-Lisbon FTA Containing
Investment Provisions
The EU-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), con-
cluded on 18 October 2013, is the first post-Lisbon FTA with investment rules.49
Before the release of the Investment Chapter of CETA, the EU published a Fact
Sheet explaining key contents of this chapter.50 The text of the Chapter was released
in September 2014 as part of the consolidated text of the treaty.51 More will be said
about these provisions below.
The EU-Singapore FTA: The EU’s First Post-Lisbon FTA
with an ASEAN/Asian State Containing Investment Provisions
According to a study of the economic benefits of the EUSFTA released on
24 September 2013, the EU views FTAs with individual ASEAN members, such
as the EUSFTA, are “stepping-stones” or “building blocks” for an EU-ASEAN
48 See European Commission (Trade), South Korea, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/. See also generally, Pollet-Fort (2011), EU Centre in
Singapore, available at: http://www.eucentre.sg/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/BackgroundBrief-
The-EU-Korea-FTA-and-its-Implications-for-the-Future-EU-Singapore-FTA.pdf.
49 The text is available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id¼973. For a recent
critical analysis of the CETA’s provisions as released to date, see Bernasconi-Osterwalder (2013).
50 European Commission (2013c).
51 See European Commission (Trade) (2014a).
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FTA.52 The EUSFTA is thus viewed as a trailblazer, set to spur further FTAs with
other ASEAN member states.53
Negotiations for the EUSFTA were launched in March 2010 and were com-
pleted by December 2012. An initialled text was released on 20 September 2013.
The text of the Investment Chapter was released in October 2014.54
The EUSFTA may be viewed as the EU’s continuing process of investment rule-
setting as it is likely to reflect many of the investment provisions that are in the
CETA. Concerning investment protection with Asian (and other) partners will be
explained in greater detail below. First, one must appreciate the current, broader EU
investment treaty negotiating agenda, as explained in the next section.
A New Generation of EU Trade and Investment Agreements
General Philosophy
Certain themes and ideas are discernible in the EU’s negotiating objectives for
new FTAs.
First, the EU is mindful that non-EU partners are of diverse economic and develop-
mental standing. Consequently, it has stated that it would be open to adapting negoti-
ations to consider this. Specifically, in the Commission’s Communication, Towards a
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, 2010, it was stated:
. . . a one-size-fits-all model for investment agreements with 3rd countries would necessar-
ily be neither feasible nor desirable. The Union will have to take into account each
specific negotiating context. The interests of our stakeholders as well as the level of
development of our partners should guide inter alia the standards the Union sets in a
specific investment negotiation. . . .
The Union should go where its investors would like to go, just like it should pave their way
abroad, through the liberalisation of investment flows. Markets with significant eco-
nomic growth or growth prospects present a particular opportunity in the current
increasingly competitive environment. It is important that EU investors have access to
these markets and that amid the changes that these economies might be undergoing,
benefit from the availability of sufficient guarantees for fair and predictable treatment.
The EU’s interests in investment negotiations would also be determined inter alia by the
political, institutional and economic climate of our partner countries. The ‘robustness’ of
investor protection through either host country or international arbitration would be
important determinants in defining priority countries for EU investment negotiations. In
particular, the capacity and the practice of our partners in upholding the rule of law, in
a manner that provides a certain and sound environment to investors, are key
52 European Commission (2013a), pp. 9 and 12.
53 The view has been expressed as follows: “The EUSFTA thus paves the way for comprehensive
FTAs with other ASEAN countries, and ultimately an agreement with the entire region. [. . .]
Singapore [. . .] regional trendsetter [. . .]”; European Commission (2013a), p. 3.
54 European Commission (Trade) (2014b).
EU-ASEAN Trade and Investment Relations with a Special Focus on Singapore 241
determinants for assessing the value of investment protection negotiations.55 (Italic
emphasis added.)
Secondly, in respect of dispute settlement, the EU seeks certainty and consis-
tency under its FTAs:
The atomisation of disputes and interpretations. Consistency and predictability are key
issues and the use of quasi-permanent arbitrators (as in the EU’s FTA practice) and/or
appellate mechanisms, where there is a likelihood of many claims under a particular
agreement, should be considered; [. . .]56
The lack of consistency between investor-State arbitral tribunals and the
resulting uncertainty in the interpretation of core investment provisions (such as
MFN clauses, for one) has led to a great deal of debate and calls for reforming the
whole investor-state dispute settlement system that exists today.57
While it appears from the above statements that the EU generally expects to
include investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms (ISDS) in its treaties, it
appears that there could be limited exceptions. In January 2014, the EU Trade
Commissioner announced that the EU would hold consultations on its investment
treaty dispute settlement provisions in the period leading up to the next negotiating
round (in March 2014) for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) with the US,58 in light of several objections to ISDS being included.59
Thirdly, the EU aims to have a balance between the right to regulate and the
need to protect investors.60 This is an important precept, particularly for the Asian
states that are negotiating with the EU. Fourthly, the EU has outlined the scope and
standards it seeks in ISDS in FTAs.61
Specific Guarantees Sought
Before the EUSFTA investment chapter was released to the public,62 and beyond
the general contours sketched out in the Communication, the EU had made avail-
able a Fact Sheet on Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement
55 European Commission (2013a), pp. 6–7.
56 European Commission (2013a), p. 10.
57 See for example, this author’s previous discussions in Hsu (2011), p. 827 and in Hsu (2014).
58 See European Commission, Press Release 14/56, Commission to consult European public on
provisions in EU-US trade deal on investment and investor-state dispute settlement, available at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-56_en.htm.
59 There have been calls to exclude any ISDS mechanism in the TTIP: see for example Financial
Times, EU and US Pressed to Drop Dispute-settlement Rule from Trade Deal, 10 March 2014. See
also Ikenson (2014).
60 European Commission (2013b), p. 3.
61 European Commission, Communication, Towards a Comprehensive European International
Investment Policy, COM(2010)343 final, p. 8.
62 See Voskamp (2013).
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in EU Agreements of November 201363 which provided important and useful
indications of the chapter’s likely contents.
With regard to treatment, the EU has spelt out the four key guarantees for
inclusion: most favoured nation, national treatment, fair and equitable treatment,
transfer of capital, expropriation provisions.64 These will be buttressed by inclusion
of an investor-State dispute mechanism.
With regard to the obligations relating to indirect expropriation and fair and
equitable treatment (FET), the EU texts with both Canada and Singapore provide
more detailed guidance on both these notions than before.65 In several FTAs
indirect expropriation is not defined, and it is only in some recent agreements that
limitations on this obligation have begun to be included.66
In the context of addressing indirect expropriation claims, the CETA and the
EUSFTA, include provisions to safeguard a State’s right to regulate and pursue
legitimate public policy objectives.67 Where that regulatory action is
non-discriminatory and taken to protect the public interest, “the right of the state
to regulate should prevail over the economic impact of those measures to the
investor”.68 It remains to be seen as to what the actual treaty text will look like.
The CETA provides that a breach of the FET obligation arises in the following
cases:
• Denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;
• Fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of trans-
parency, in judicial and administrative proceedings.
• Manifest arbitrariness;
• Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or
religious belief;
• Abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment.69
By comparison, the “scoping list” of the FET provision in the EUSFTA differs,
stating the following:70
2. To comply with the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment set out in paragraph
1, neither Party shall adopt measures that constitute:
(a) Denial of justice12 in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings;
(b) A fundamental breach of due process;
63 European Commission (2013b).
64 European Commission (2013b), p. 4.
65 European Commission (2013b), pp. 7–10.
66 European Commission (2013c).
67 Annex X.11, CETA and Annex 9A, EUSFTA.
68 European Commission (2013c), p. 7.
69 European Commission (2013c); according to the Fact Sheet, this will “avoid too wide interpre-
tations and provide clear guidelines to tribunals“.
70 Art. 9.4.2, EUSFTA. (Other differences in the FET provisions of the two agreements exist and
can be appreciated only by reading both sets of provisions in full.)
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(c) Manifestly arbitrary conduct;
(d) Harassment, coercion, abuse of power or similar bad faith conduct; or
(e) A breach of the legitimate expectations of an investor arising from specific or unam-
biguous representations13 from a Party to induce the investment and which are reason-
ably relied upon by the investor.
13 For greater certainty, representations made to induce the investments include the
representations made to convince the investor to continue with, not to liquidate or to
make subsequent investments.
This list of guiding factors comes as no surprise, as they have been adopted by
various arbitral tribunals in the past.71 In a way, this is a kind of “codification” of
such tribunals’ reasoning of the FET standard. The language of the final text,
however, and its exact scope, again, remain to be seen.
The negotiated text of the Investment Chapter of the EUSFTA was made
publicly available in October 2014. The text, with other chapters, awaits “legal
scrubbing” at this time of writing, and thereafter, ratification by the EU and
implementing legislation in Singapore. The Chapter includes provisions
addressing, inter alia, the following matters in relation to investor-State disputes:72
– Prevention of claims by investors that are “manifestly without merit” and
“unfounded as a matter of law”73;
– Transparency in dispute proceedings; while the UNCITRAL Rules on Transpar-
ency in Treaty-Based Arbitration that came into effect in 201474 are explicitly
made applicable in the CETA text, the EUSFTA incorporates its own, modified
transparency provisions75;
– A Code of Conduct for arbitrators and mediators;
– The possibility to consider in certain cases, an appellate mechanism76;
– Provisions on the role of a Trade Committee to adopt interpretations of pro-
visions in the EUSFTA.77
Article 9.4 reflects the EU approach mentioned above, and relates fair and
equitable treatment with some of the factors mentioned in the EU fact sheets,
such as denial of justice in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings, a
fundamental breach of due process and manifestly arbitrary conduct.
Art. 9.4.5 sets out a relatively specific provision on frustration or undermining of
specific commitments made in written contractual agreements:
71 For useful overviews and case examples, see UNCTAD (2012); and OECD (2004), for
examples.
72 EUSFTA (2013), pp. 8–9.
73 Art. 9.23 and 9.24 of the EUSFTA Investment Chapter.
74 UNCITRAL, Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, available at:
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-
E.pdf.
75 See CETA, Art. X.33 and EUSFTA Art. 9.25 and Art. Annex 9.C.
76 Art. 9.33.1 of the EUSFTA.
77 Art. 9.33.2(b) and Art. 9.22.3 of the EUSFTA.
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5. Where a Party, itself or through any entity mentioned in article 1 paragraph 5, had given
any specific and clearly spelt out commitment in a contractual written obligation14
towards an investor of the other Party with respect to the investor’s investment or
towards such an investment, that Party shall not frustrate or undermine the said
commitment through the exercise of its governmental authority15 either:
(a) deliberately; or
(b) in a way which substantially alters the balance of rights and obligation in the contractual
written obligation unless the Party provides reasonable compensation to restore the
investor or investment to a position which it would have been in had the frustration or
undermining not occurred.
14 For the purposes of this paragraph, a “contractual written obligation” means an agree-
ment in writing, entered into by both parties, whether in a single instrument or multiple
instruments, that creates an exchange of rights and obligations, binding both parties.
15 For the purposes of this article, a Party frustrates or undermines a commitment through
the exercise of its governmental authority when it frustrates or undermines the said
commitment through the adoption, maintenance or non-adoption of measures manda-
tory or enforceable under domestic laws.
While this provision is not crafted in the form of a conventional, broadly-worded
“umbrella clause”, it does create a separate treaty obligation that could be violated
in the manner set out in (a) and (b) in relation to contractual obligations between a
State and an investor.
Notably, a provision in the CETA on expropriation and intellectual property
rights (and an accompanying Declaration by the Parties) has not been included in
the EUSFTA.78
However, the EUSFTA Investment Chapter Annex provides as follows:
Annex 9-C to the Investment Protection Section
EXPROPRIATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
For greater certainty, the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to
the extent that these measures are consistent with TRIPS Agreement and Chapter 11
(Intellectual Property) of this Agreement, do not constitute expropriation. Moreover, a
determination that these measures are inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement and
Chapter 11 (Intellectual Property) of this Agreement does not establish that there has
been an expropriation.
Dispute Settlement
Apart from the above observations, which relate to interpretation under ISDS, the
following are other features of ISDS under the EUSFTA.
78Art.X.11.6 of the CETA provides as follows: 6. For greater certainty, the revocation, limitation
or creation of intellectual property rights to the extent that these measures are consistent with
TRIPS and Chapter X (Intellectual Property) of this Agreement, do not constitute expropriation.
Moreover, a determination that these actions are inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement or
Chapter X (Intellectual Property) of this Agreement does not establish that there has been an
expropriation. The related Declaration is found at p. 185 of the CETA Consolidated Text, available
at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.
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To permit and encourage parties to consider the use of alternative dispute
resolution methods, Chapter 16 of the EUSFTA provides for a Mediation Mecha-
nism.79 As not all ISDS provisions are accompanied by such explicit processes, the
parties here appear to place emphasis on the availability and use of such means to
settle disputes. Such a stance would be consistent with the general interest in the EU
and in Singapore to promote the use of mediation.
Arbitration hearings will be open to the public, unless the two States decide
otherwise.80 This is not new for Singapore, as the USSFTA, which came into force
much earlier, had already envisaged open hearings.81
The EUSFTA includes provisions on the remuneration of arbitrators, linking
these to ICSID Regulation standards.82 In contrast, the CETA contains more control
mechanisms.83 These provisions reflect the EU thinking that the remuneration and
expenses of arbitrators would be “based on standards of comparable international
dispute resolution mechanisms in bilateral or multilateral agreements.” As
explained by the EU, the aim of such provisions is to take “action against spiraling
costs through effective limits to the costs of arbitration”, such action being
described as a “first in an ISDS mechanism”.84
Finally, the EUSFTA will also include provisions governing the conduct of
arbitrators, to deal with matters such as conflicts of interest.85 This has been the
subject of some recent challenges in ICSID arbitrations and the provisions are
intended to forestall such challenges in an arbitration. While these are important
guiding provisions, they do not appear to address with specificity, for example,
challenges which are based on an arbitrator who may have, before appointment,
expressed a particular view on relevant legal principles in academic or professional
79 Articles 9.15 of the Investment Chapter also encourages amicable settlements of investor-State
disputes, while Art. 9.16 provides for mediation (read with Annex 9A) and alternative dispute
resolution.
80 Article 2, Annex 9.C EUSFTA.
81 Art. 15.20, USSFTA; entry into force on 1 January 2004—the text and background information
are available at: http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_ussfta.asp?hl¼13.
82 Art. 9.29 EUSFTA.
83 Para. 9, Annex 1, Rules of Procedure and Code of Conduct, CETA provides: 9. Unless the
Parties agree otherwise, they shall meet the arbitration panel within seven working days of its
establishment in order to determine such matters that the Parties or the arbitration panel deem
appropriate, including the remuneration and expenses to be paid to the arbitrators, which shall be
in accordance with WTO standards. Remuneration for each arbitrator’s assistant shall not exceed
50 % of the total remuneration of that arbitrator. Members of the arbitration panel and represen-
tatives of the Parties may take part in this meeting via telephone or video conference;
Art. 9.29 of the EUSFTA provides: The fees and expenses of the arbitrators shall be those
determined pursuant to Regulation 14(1) of the Administrative and Financial Regulations of the
ICSID Convention in force on the date of the initiation of the arbitration.
84 European Commission (2013c), p. 3.
85 Annex 9-B, Code of Conduct for Arbitrators and Mediators. On such challenges generally, see
Daele (2012).
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journals or is in a law firm whose other members may be involved in advising
related entities.86
Other Aspects Related to Investment: Intellectual Property
and Medicines
TRIPS-plus FTA provisions,87 especially as they pertain to regulation of patenting
and sale of pharmaceutical products, have been a source of global debate.88 Such
provisions provide investors who hold patents and other legal rights in the FTA
States to gain legal protection via the FTA’s provisions governing IP rights and
pharmaceutical product approval licensing, and on ISDS. In many FTAs, IP rights
(such as pharmaceutical patents) fall within definitions of protected “investments”
under investment provisions, with the result that challenges under ISDS may be
brought if a violation of rights related to such investments are claimed.
Under the USSFTA Singapore had already agreed to certain TRIPS-plus com-
mitments. The EUSFTA text of Chapter 11 on Intellectual Property Rights appears
to impose far fewer TRIPS-plus requirements for these products. However,
Chapter 2, Annex 2-C Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices does impose
a number of new disciplines for Singapore relating to, inter alia, listing, pricing and
reimbursement of pharmaceutical products.89
Other ASEAN TPP countries, that the EU is in FTA negotiations with, are
Malaysia and Vietnam. The EU FTA negotiators will no doubt be monitoring the
IP negotiations of the TPP to assess what these two countries might agree to. By
way of general note, it was reported recently that incoming Chilean TPP negotiators
have “drawn a red line” (or ceiling) at the US-Chile FTA level of pharmaceutical IP
rights protection.90
86 See for example ICSID, ARB/12/20, Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd v
Venezuela.
87 These refer to FTA provisions which impose intellectual property protection standards that
exceed those required under the WTO’s Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(TRIPS), Annex 1C of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299. TRIPS-plus provisions such as those, which affect the patenting and licensing of
pharmaceutical products, have been included in a number of FTAs.
88 See, for example, Lindstrom (2010), p. 917; and Collin-Chase (2008), p. 763.
89 See Art. 3, Annex 2-C; text available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/
tradoc_151731.pdf.
90 Incoming Chilean Officials Convey TPP Red Lines in Meeting with Froman, Inside US Trade
32 (2014) 7, 14 February 2014.
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Conclusion
As the EUSFTA negotiations are the EU’s first to be completed among those with
ASEANmembers, negotiators in the other ASEAN negotiating States will no doubt
be studying the released text as a matter of reference, comparison and negotiation.
These other members may have offensive and defensive negotiating interests that
differ from those of Singapore, so that they may seek some variations in specific
areas. Examples of such areas are trade in goods (such as agriculture, machinery
and transport equipment) trade in services, government procurement and the level
of protection of IPRs, including those relating to pharmaceutical products and
services related to their distribution. It is also not clear if they will accept the
insertion of an umbrella clause in their treaties with the EU, given that such clauses
have led to somewhat surprising (and costly) challenges elsewhere, as mentioned.
The investment provisions, given that ASEAN members have varying reservations
in past economic agreements, may be a further area in which negotiations may take
more time.91
For States that may have GSP preferences that have an imminent expiry date,
there could be an added impetus to conclude a FTA with the EU.92 ASEAN States
such as Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are beneficiaries under the
EU’s 2014 GSP scheme.93 As of 2014, Malaysia no longer benefits under the EU’s
GSP scheme.94
The EUSFTA signals a first between the EU and Singapore in several ways, and
may well lead to conclusion of further FTAs soon between other ASEAN members
and the EU. For the moment, it would appear that an EU-ASEAN agreement will
take some time to materialise.95
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